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INTRODUCTION 
YouTube, the video sharing website has risen to be one of the most 
popular and profitable websites on the Internet. What was first created 
in February 2005 as a platform for people all over the world to share 
videos, has now developed into a billion dollar business, that is an 
integral part of the Google corporation. However, while the success and 
popularity of YouTube is clear, the associated copyright issues which lie 
at the very core of the YouTube platform, are far from settled. 
Evidencing the legal uncertainty surrounding the operation of YouTube, 
is the recent high profile litigation which has been brought by 
entertainment company, Viacom International. The case filed in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and 
any subsequent appeals, have the potential to be one of the most 
influential copyright decisions in the digital era.  
YouTube is not the only user generated intermediary to have 
encountered legal difficulties, rather it exemplifies the copyright 
challenges facing user generated intermediaries. Indeed, the evolution of 
Web 2.0 and other new digital technologies have enabled digital content 
to be easily reproduced and communicated online, without the 
permission of the copyright owner. The following chapter will provide 
an analysis of the recent Viacom v YouTube litigtion, including the claims 
                                                        
•  The law as it appears in this chapter is current as of August 2007. 
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brought by Viacom, both party’s arguments and an examination of the 
key issues, which are likely to decide the outcome of the case. The 
chapter will also consider copyright challenges for other user generated 
intermediaries, such as blogs and wikis. Finally, the chapter will provide 
an analysis from an Australian perspective of some of the copyright 
challenges which user generated intermediaries are likely to encounter 
under Australian copyright law.  
 
VIACOM v YOUTUBE  
Viacom’s complaint 
On 13 March 2007, Viacom International Inc, one of the largest media 
corporations in the United States brought an action for copyright 
infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York against YouTube Inc and its parent company, 
Google Inc.1 The complaint begins with an analysis of the technological 
landscape. In essence, Viacom assert that the emergence of new digital 
technologies over the past decade have revolutionised the way people 
inform and entertain themselves. Viacom claims, while many people 
have used these technologies to express themselves creatively, these very 
same digital technologies have also been misused to fuel an explosion of 
copyright infringement. In Viacom’s view, YouTube is one such entity. 
In paragraph two of the complaint Viacom allege that: 
YouTube has harnessed technology to wilfully infringe copyright on a 
huge scale, depriving writers, composers and performers of the rewards 
they are owed for effort and innovation, reducing the incentive of 
America’s creative industries, and profiting from the illegal conduct of 
others as well. Using the leverage of the Internet, YouTube appropriates 
the value of creative content on a massive scale for YouTube’s benefit 
                                                        
1 Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Inc, 07-cv-02103 (United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007).  For a 
copy of the complaint see Evan Brown, Viacom sues YouTube (2007) Internet Cases 
<http://www.internetcases.com/archives/2007/03/viacom_sues_you.html> at 30 June 
2007; also see Greg Sandoval, Viacom sues Google over YouTube clips (2007) CNET News 
<http://news.com.com/Viacom+sues+Google+over+YouTube+clips/2100-1030_3-
6166668.html> at 30 June 2007. 
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without payment of license. YouTube’s brazen disregard of the intellectual 
property laws fundamentally threatens not just the Plaintiffs, but the 
economic underpinnings of one of the most important sectors of the 
United States economy.2 
Viacom further allege in the complaint that the: 
Defendants actively engage in, promote and induce this infringement. 
YouTube itself publicly performs the infringing videos on the YouTube 
site and other websites. Thus, YouTube does not simply enable massive 
infringement by its users. It is YouTube that knowingly reproduces and 
publicly performs the copyrighted works uploaded to its site. YouTube 
deliberately built up a library of infringing works to draw traffic to the 
YouTube site, enabling it to gain a commanding market share, earn 
significant revenues, and increase its enterprise value. YouTube has 
deliberately chosen not to take reasonable precautions to deter the 
rampant infringement on its site. Because YouTube directly profits from 
the availability of popular infringing works on its site, it has decided to 
shift the burden entirely onto copyright owners to monitor the YouTube 
site on a daily or hourly basis to detect infringing videos and send notices 
to YouTube demanding that it “take down” the infringing works.3 
At the heart of the complaint, Viacom alleges six causes of action of 
copyright infringement against YouTube and Google. The first three 
causes of action attempt to hold YouTube and Google liable for primary 
or direct copyright infringement. They are for: 
1. Public performance – the defendants have, without permission 
of the copyright owner, publicly performed and authorised the 
public performance of the infringing uploaded videos;  
2. Public display – the defendants have, without permission of the 
copyright owner, publicly displayed and authorised the public 
display of the infringing uploaded videos; and 
3. Reproduction – the defendants have, without permission of the 
copyright owner, reproduced and authorised the reproduction 
of the infringing uploaded videos through the YouTube 
website. 
 
                                                        
2 Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Inc, 07-cv-02103 (United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007) [2]. 
3 Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Inc, 07-cv-02103 (United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007) [4]-[6]. 
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The final three causes of action all attempt to hold YouTube and 
Google liable under the doctrine of secondary or indirect copyright 
infringement. These claims include: 
4. Inducement of copyright infringement – the defendants are 
liable for inducing the infringing acts of YouTube users, who 
infringe the plaintiff’s copyright by uploading infringing videos 
to the YouTube website. 
5. Contributory copyright infringement – the defendants are liable 
for contributing to the infringing acts of YouTube users, who 
infringe the plaintiff’s copyright by uploading infringing videos 
to the YouTube website.  
6. Vicarious copyright infringement – the defendants are 
vicariously liable for the infringing acts of YouTube users, who 
infringe the plaintiff’s copyright by uploading infringing videos 
to the YouTube website.  
Countering the claims by Viacom, YouTube and Google in their defence 
claim that: 
Viacom’s complaint in this action challenges the careful balance 
established by Congress when it enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA). The DMCA balances the rights of copyright holders and 
the need to protect the Internet as an important new form of 
communication. By seeking to make carriers and hosting providers liable 
for Internet communications, Viacom’s complaint threatens the way 
hundreds of millions of people legitimately exchange information, news, 
entertainment and political and artistic expression. Google and YouTube 
respect the importance of intellectual property rights, and not only comply 
with their safe harbor obligations under the DMCA, but go well and 
beyond what the law requires.4  
YouTube and Google’s defence, essentially denies each of the allegations 
in Viacom’s complaint and raises 12 defences in their favour. These 
defences include the safe harbors, licence, fair use, failure to mitigate, 
failure to state a claim, innocent intent, copyright misuse, estoppel, 
waiver, unclean hands, laches and substantial non-infringing uses.  
                                                        
4 See Elinor Mills, Google denies Viacom copyright charges (2007) CNET News 
<http://www.news.com/2100-1026_3-6180387.html> at 30 June 2007. 
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The key issues likely to decide the case  
A ‘volitional act’ 
Viacom v YouTube Inc and Google Inc is likely to be decided on the basis of 
three key issues, which are in question in the case. The first issue 
concerns the allegations of primary or direct copyright infringement 
against YouTube and Google. In particular, whether the necessary 
element of volition is present in YouTube’s operations. In order to 
establish an action for primary or direct copyright infringement under 
United States copyright law, there must first be a volitional act 
committed by the defendant in regard to the infringement.5 Generally, 
the courts in the United States have held that the automated copying by 
machines, occasioned by others, is insufficient to establish a volitional 
act. Importantly, in Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line 
Communications Service Inc,6 the Court held that ‘[a]lthough copyright is a 
strict liability statute, there still should be some element of volition or 
causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to 
create a copy by a third party.’ This issue of volition was more recently 
examined in Parker v Google Inc,7 where the Court held ‘[w]hen an ISP 
automatically and temporarily stores data without human intervention so 
that the system can operate and transmit data to its users, the necessary 
element of volition is missing.’ 
In the present case, the question will be whether the manner in which 
the uploaded videos are performed, displayed and created is sufficiently 
automated enough, so as to negate any active volitional involvement by 
YouTube in each act. This issue is likely to come down to a technical 
analysis of YouTube’s involvement in the uploaded videos, for example 
whether transcoding the uploaded videos into Flash format – so that 
they can be viewed on the YouTube website – constitutes a volitional 
act, or is simply an automated process without any active, volitional 
involvement. However, it should be noted that most of the decisions 
                                                        
5 Whilst under the Copyright Act (US) a person need not intentionally infringe copyright, it 
does require conduct by a person, who causes in some meaningful way an infringement. 
Costar Group Inc v LoopNet Inc, 373 F3d 544, 549 (4th Cir 2004). 
6 907 F Supp 1361, 1368-1370 (ND Cal 1995). 
7 422 F Supp 2d 492, 497 (ED Pa, 2006). 
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involving a ‘volitional act’ have concerned the caching and archiving of 
data by an Internet service provider. In this regard, the Court may well 
apply the same reasoning applied in Playboy Enterprises Inc v Frena,8 where 
the defendant was found liable for hosting images uploaded by others, 
despite the defendant claiming there was no active, volitional 
involvement.  
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Assuming the necessary element of volition can be established, the 
second issue likely to be heavily contested is the application of the safe 
harbor provisions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (US)9. 
These provisions limit liability for qualifying service providers from 
monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory copyright 
infringement. 10  The relevant safe harbor in question is § 512(c)(1) 11 
which provides: 
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as 
provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a 
user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated 
by or for the service provider, if the service provider: 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an 
activity using the material on the system or network is 
infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access t, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to 
the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider 
has the right and ability to control such activity; and 
                                                        
8 839 F Supp 1552 (MD Fla 1993). 
9 17 USC § 512. 
10 Perfect 10 Inc v Cybernet Ventures Inc, 213 F Supp 2d 1146, 1174 (CD Cal 2002).  
11 17 USC. 
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(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in 
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be 
the subject of infringing activity. 
The ‘red flag’ provision 
In particular, two provisions will be crucial to the case, § 512(c)(1)(A)12 
the ‘red flag’ provision and § 512(c)(1)(B) 13  the financial benefit 
provision. Under § 512(c)(1)(A),14 a service provider will be disqualified 
from the safe harbors, if they had actual or ‘red flag’ knowledge of the 
infringing material. Under this provision, a service provider, such as 
YouTube, is not under a positive obligation to remove material, which 
infringes copyright. However, they will lose their safe harbor, where they 
become aware of ‘red flags’, that is facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent, and they fail to act.  
In this regard, Viacom asserts that YouTube does have the requisite 
knowledge of copyrighted material uploaded to their website.15  They 
claim that YouTube actively monitors uploaded videos, for example, 
they remove obscene or offensive videos and create ‘channels’ and 
‘featured videos’ sections.16 This aspect of the case is likely to require an 
analysis, into just how much actual or constructive knowledge YouTube 
have in regard to the infringing videos, including the technology which 
YouTube currently uses. It should also be noted, that the comments 
made by YouTube chief executive, that YouTube will use filtering 
technology to identify and remove infringing videos for copyright 
owners who have entered into agreements with YouTube, is likely to 
count in Viacom’s favour.17  
                                                        
12 17 USC. 
13 17 USC. 
14 17 USC. 
15 Michael Fricklas, Our Case Against YouTube (2007) The Washington Post 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/03/23/AR2007032301451.html> at 30 June 2007. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Inc, 07-cv-02103 (United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007) [7], 
[45]. 
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The ‘financial benefit’ provision  
The second provision which is likely to be heavily litigated, is the 
financial benefit provision.18 Under this provision, a service provider will 
be disqualified from the safe harbor, where they receive a financial 
benefit, which is directly attributable to the infringing activity, where 
they have right and ability to control that activity.19 Generally, a service 
provider conducting a legitimate business will not be considered to have 
received a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity’. 
For example, receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic payments 
from customers, whether they be engaging in infringing activities or not, 
would not constitute a ‘financial benefit’. However, the situation in 
YouTube’s case is quite different, as their main form of revenue is 
through advertisements which feature on search pages, licensed videos 
and previously above the videos themselves, including infringing videos.      
This provision was recently considered in Perfect 10 Inc v CCBill,20 where 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 
relevant enquiry to make when considering whether a service provider 
has received a ‘direct financial benefit’, is ‘whether the infringing activity 
constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just an added benefit’.21 Similarly, 
in a recent summary judgment hearing in Tur v YouTube Inc,22 the Court 
held that a provider’s receipt of a financial benefit is only implicated 
where the provider has the right and ability to control the infringing 
activity. 23  The Court held that the ‘right and ability to control’ the 
activity refers to something more than just the ability of a service 
provider to remove or block access to material posted on its website or 
stored in its system. 24  Rather, the Court held the requirement 
                                                        
18 17 USC § 512(c)(1)(B). 
19 17 USC § 512(c)(1)(B). 
20 481 F 3d 751 (9th Cir, 2007). 
21 Ellison v Robertson, 357 F 3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir 2004). 
22 cv-06-04436 (CD Cal, filed 14/7/2006). 
23 Perfect 10 Inc v CCBill, 481 F 3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007). 
24 Hendrickson v Ebay Inc, 165 F Supp 2d 1082, 1093 (CD Cal, 2001); Perfect 10 Inc v Cybernet 
Ventures Inc, 213 F Supp 2d 1146, 1183 (CD Cal 2002); Corbis Corp v Amazon.com Inc, 351 F 
Supp 2d 1090 (WD Wash, 2004). 
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presupposes some antecedent liability to limit or filter copyrighted 
material.25 
In Viacom’s view, YouTube is an entertainment destination. ‘The public 
at large are not attracted to YouTube’s storage facility or technical 
functionality – people are attracted to the entertainment value of what’s 
on the site’.26 In this regard, Viacom claim that YouTube will lose their 
safe harbor, as they are receiving a direct financial benefit from 
infringing videos, where they have the right and ability to control the 
activity, through the sale of advertisements. This may potentially be one 
of Viacom’s strongest arguments in the case, as previously YouTube 
operated banner advertisements directly above the videos, including 
videos which infringed copyright. Arguably, the effect of this may be 
that YouTube was not receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat periodic 
payments, rather a direct financial benefit, every time a user viewed an 
infringing video.27 
 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES FOR OTHER USER GENERATED 
INTERMEDIARIES  
YouTube is not the only user generated intermediary to encounter 
difficulties with copyright law. Currently other user generated 
intermediaries, including MySpace, Veoh, Grouper and Bolt are all the 
subject of ongoing litigation for copyright infringement.28 It should be 
                                                        
25 Fonovisa v Cherry Auction Inc, 76 F 3d 259, 263 (9th Cir, 1996); MGM Inc v Grokster, 545 
US 913, 926.  
26 Fricklas, above n 15. 
27 Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Inc, 07-cv-02103 (United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007) [37]. 
Note that in July 2007 a French Court held online video sharing website, DailyMotion 
liable for copyright infringement, despite concluding that the website was a mere ‘hosting 
service’. See David Ardia, French court finds DailyMotion liable for copyright infringement (2007) 
Citizen Media Law Project <http://www.citmedialaw.org/french-court-finds-
dailymotion-liable-copyright-infringement> at 20 July 2007. 
28 For example see Greg Sandoval, Universal sues MySpace for copyright violations (2007) 
CNET News 
<http://news.com.com/Universal+sues+MySpace+for+copyright+violations/2100-
1030_3-6136829.html> at 30 June 2007; Tur v YouTube Inc, cv-06-04436 (CD Cal, filed 
14/7/2006); Io Group Inc v Veoh Networks Inc, cv-06-3926 (ND Cal, filed 23/6/2006); 
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noted, that YouTube is also the subject of a number of other actions for 
copyright infringement.29 In particular, a recent class action filed against 
YouTube and Google by the English Premier League and independent 
music publisher, Bourne Co.30 The copyright issues associated with these 
user generated intermediaries also have the potential to extend to more 
participatory intermediaries, such as blogs and wikis.31 Indeed, in many 
cases the copyright issues involved are likely to be more prevalent, given 
the highly personalised form of content production which blogs and 
wikis provide. In this regard, it should be noted that thus far, there is yet 
to be a major reported decision involving issues of copyright 
infringement on a blog or wiki, although there have been a number of 
cases filed against blogs and bloggers, which have failed to proceed to 
trial.32 
                                                                                                                  
Universal Music Group Recordings Inc et al v Grouper Networks Inc, No 06-6561 (CD Cal, filed 
16/10/2006); Universal Music Group Recordings Inc et al v Bolt Inc, No 06-6577 (CD Cal, filed 
16/10/2006); Universal Music Group Recordings Inc et al v MySpace Inc, No 06-7631 (CD Cal, 
filed 17/11/2006). Note also that in July 2007 the Motion Picture Association of America 
Inc filed suis in a United States District Court in Los Angeles against YouTVpc.com and 
Peekvid.com on behalf of a number of film studios. See Kevin Delaney, Web sites face film 
studios’ copyright suits (2007) The Wall Street Journal Online 
<http://www.online.wsj.com/article/SB118298577921950757.html?mod=googlenews_w
sj> at 16 July 2007. 
29 The Football Association Premier League Limited and Bourne Co v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC 
and Google Inc, 07 CV-3582 (United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, filed 4 May 2007); Tur v YouTube Inc, cv-06-4436 (CD Cal, 2006); Cal IV 
Entertainment v YouTube Inc, cv-00617; also see Greg Sandoval, French sports join suit against 
YouTube (2007) CNET News 
<http://news.om.com/French+sports+groups+join+suit+against+YouTube/2100-
1030_3-6188948.html> at 20 July 2007. 
30 For more information see http://www.youtubeclassaction.com. 
31 For an overview of the legal issues involving blogs see Damien O'Brien, ‘Blogs and the 
Law: Key Legal Issues for the Blogosphere’ (2007) 12 Media and Arts Law Review 141; also 
see Peter Black, Hayden Delaney and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Legal issues for wikis: The 
challenges of user-generated and peer-produce knowledge, content and culture’ (2007) 14 
eLaw Journal 245. 
32 For example a Maine advertising agency in May 2006 filed a copyright infringement suit 
against a local blogger who had posted a number of draft advertisements from the Maine 
Department of Economic and Community Development website, to his blog. The case 
was eventually withdrawn by the advertising agency. See Warren Kremer Paino Advertising v 
Duston, Civil No 06-047 (5 May 2006); Harry Wessel, Orlando lawyer is Web hero after 
defending blogger (2006) Orlando Sentinel <http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/orl-
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USER GENERATED INTERMEDIARIES UNDER 
AUSTRALIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
While user generated intermediaries are afforded a degree of certainty 
and protection under the safe harbor provisions in the United States. 
The situation is less clear in other jurisdictions, like Australia. While the 
Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) contains similar safe harbour 
provisions to the United States, their operation is significantly narrower. 
In addition to this, Australian courts have also interpreted the legislative 
provisions regarding authorisation liability (secondary liability) strictly. 
Further uncertainties arise in regard to the multiple levels of potential 
liability under copyright law, for user generated intermediaries.  
Authorisation of copyright infringement  
Under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) a person or organisation that 
authorises another person to do an infringing act, without the licence of 
the owner, will themselves infringe copyright.33 In determining whether 
a person or organisation has authorised the doing of an act which 
infringes copyright, it is necessary to consider: 
(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of 
the act concerned; 
(b) the nature of any relationship existing between the person and 
the person who did the act concerned; and 
(c) whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent 
or avoid the doing of the act, including whether the person 
complied with any relevant industry codes of practice.34  
However, in order to protect the position of intermediaries, such as 
carriage service providers (CSPs), a defence to authorisation liability was 
                                                                                                                  
blogsuit1206may12,0,2087986.story?track=rss> at 30 June 2007; Robert Weisman, Blogger 
who criticized Maine tourism office faces lawsuit (2006) The Boston Globe 
<http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/04/28/blogger_who_criticized_main
e_tourism_office_faces_lawsuit/> at 30 June 2007. Also see NXIVM Corporation and First 
Principles Inc v The Ross Institute, WL 22298756 (NDNY 2003); NXIVM Corporation and First 
Principles Inc v The Ross Institute, F 3d 471 (2nd Cir 2004); NXIVM Corporation and First 
Principles Inc v The Ross Institute, 543 US 1000 (2004). 
33 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1), 101(1). 
34 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1A), 101(1A); University of New South Wales v Moorhouse and 
Angus & Robertson (1975) 133 CLR 1. 
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introduced under ss 39B and 112E of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This 
defence provides that a person, including CSPs, will not be held to have 
authorised copyright infringement merely because the facilities provided 
by them for making a communication, are used by someone else to 
infringe copyright.35 The effect of this defence was first considered in 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper, where the Federal Court held 
that s 112E did not apply, as Cooper had done more than simply 
provide the facilities for the making of communications, by encouraging 
users to download infringing music files.36 Similarly, in Universal Music Pty 
Ltd v Sharman Licence Holdings the Federal Court held that the defence 
under s 112E did not apply to the defendants, as they had committed 
positive acts designed to encourage copyright infringement.37 
There remains little judicial guidance on the interpretation of ss 39B and 
112E of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). However, from the decided cases it 
would appear that where the person or organisation is intimately 
involved with the infringing content then this defence to authorisation 
will not apply. For example, in Universal Music Pty Ltd v Sharman Licence 
Holdings Wilcox J held that something more is required than simply 
providing the facilities for someone else to infringe copyright to be held 
liable for authorisation. 38  Notably, Wilcox J held that the legislative 
intention of s 112E was to ‘protect the messenger’, ie CSPs and Internet 
service providers.39  
In this regard, the critical question for user generated intermediaries 
under Australian copyright law will be firstly, whether they will be held 
liable for authorising copyright infringement for the infringing acts of 
their users and secondly, whether they will be entitled to the defence to 
authorisation of copyright infringement. Although, most user generated 
intermediaries do not in anyway encourage copyright infringement. 
Applying the reasoning of Wilcox J it would seem that some user 
                                                        
35 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 39B, 112E; note this also applies to moral rights under 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 195AVB. 
36 [2005] FCA 972 (Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005) [97]-[99]; Affd Cooper v Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187 (French, Branson and Kenny JJ, 18 December 2006). 
37 [2005] FCA 1242 (Wilcox J, 5 September 2005) [405]. 
38 [2005] FCA 1242 (Wilcox J, 5 September 2005) [401]. 
39 Universal Music Pty Ltd v Sharman Licence Holdings [2005] FCA 1242 (Wilcox J, 5 
September 2005) [398], [418]. 
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generated intermediaries, for example YouTube, are more than a mere 
‘messenger’; as they are essentially providing a content service to the 
public, which extends beyond traditional services offered by CSPs or 
Internet service providers. Furthermore, the level of involvement by 
some user generated intermediaries, which for example transcode 
uploaded content into different formats or offer users additional 
services, may mean that they will be found liable for authorising 
copyright infringement and the defence under s 112E denied.40 
 Safe harbour provisions 
As a result of the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth), a 
number of changes have been made to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
concerning the liability of CSPs for the infringement of copyright.41 
These new provisions are an attempt to bring Australian copyright law in 
line with the ‘safe harbor’ provisions in the United States under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998. Notably, these provisions do not 
provide a complete defence for CSPs for copyright infringement; instead 
they act to mitigate liability by limiting the remedies available against 
CSPs for copyright infringement in certain circumstances.  
There are four categories of online activities outlined in ss 116AC to 
116AF which will qualify for a limitation of remedies for the 
authorisation of copyright infringement under the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth). Generally, most user generated intermediaries will fall within the 
‘Category C Activity’ under s 116AE, which refers to the storing of 
copyright material at the direction of the user on a system or network 
operated by or for the CSP. Under this category in order for a CSP to 
qualify for the limitation of remedies they must comply with each of the 
conditions outlined in s 116AH of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), including 
adopting and implementing a policy to terminate the accounts of repeat 
infringers, complying with relevant industry codes, not receiving a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity where they 
have the right and ability to control the activity and expeditiously 
                                                        
40 Other indicative factors include, exercising discretion in removing infringing content 
and obtaining a financial benefit from the infringing content. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
ss 36(1A), 101(1A); Universal Music Pty Ltd v Sharman Licence Holdings [2005] FCA 1242 
(Wilcox J, 5 September 2005) [404]. 
41 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AA. 
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removing or disabling access to infringing material they are hosting 
when they become aware of it, or facts that make it apparent that the 
material is infringing.  
The key question to be determined in considering whether user 
generated intermediaries will be entitled to the limitation of remedies 
under the ‘safe harbour’ provisions, will be whether they fall within the 
definition of a CSP. Under s 87 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), 
a CSP is defined narrowly as a person supplying a carriage service to the 
public using a network. It would seem unlikely that user generated 
intermediaries would fall within this definition, as they do not per se 
supply a carriage service to the public, unlike Internet service providers 
or CSPs. User generated intermediaries do not provide Internet access 
or any other carriage services, they simply provide the facility to host 
user generated content. Therefore, user generated intermediaries are 
unlikely to be classified as a CSP and thus will not be entitled to the 
benefit of the ‘safe harbour’ provisions under the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth).  
It should be noted that under the equivalent ‘safe harbor’ provision 
under § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (US)42 in the 
United States, that user generated intermediaries will be entitled to the 
protection of the ‘safe harbor’ provisions, providing they comply with 
the necessary pre-conditions. This provision in the United States has 
broader operation, due to the fact that it applies to not only service 
providers, but also online service providers. An online service provider 
is defined broadly under § 512(k)(1)(b) as a provider of online services 
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor. This broad 
definition will therefore include virtually every online service. 43  The 
courts have also endorsed the expansive nature of the definition of an 
online service provider, holding that peer to peer file sharing services, 
Amazon and eBay all fall within the definition of an online service 
provider.44 Indeed, in Re Aimster Copyright Litigation,45 the United States 
                                                        
42 17 USC. 
43 Fred von Lohmann, ‘DMCA “Safe Harbors” for Online Service Providers’ (2006) 237 
InfoSys 1, 3. 
44 Corbis v Amazon.com, 351 F Supp 2d 1090 (WD Wash 2004); Hendrickson v Amazon.com, 
298 F Supp 2d 914, 915 (CD Cal 2003); Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F Supp 2d 634 
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District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the term 
online service provider ‘is defined so broadly that we have trouble 
imagining the existence of an online service that would not fall under the 
definitions…’. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Copyright law by its very nature fundamentally challenges the operation 
of user generated intermediaries, such as YouTube. The rapid 
development of Web 2.0 and other new digital technologies have 
enabled consumers to easily reproduce and communicate digital content 
online, without the permission of the copyright owner. These challenges 
are highlighted in the recent Viacom v YouTube and Google litigation, which 
has the potential to redefine copyright law in the digital era. This 
litigation will also be a vital test case for other user generated 
intermediaries, such as blogs and wikis which face similar copyright 
challenges. While, it is impossible to predict how the court will decide in 
the Viacom v YouTube and Google case, assuming it does not settle, there 
are certainly strong arguments in favour of Viacom.  
In this regard, the safe harbor provisions in the United States and similar 
jurisdictions, were designed to strike a balance between competing 
interests. Service providers are given a degree of certainty, in that they 
need not actively monitor their services for copyrighted material, whilst 
copyright owners receive the benefit of expedited procedures to remove 
infringing content. The safe harbors were not designed to protect service 
providers who fail to satisfy the necessary preconditions.  Indeed, any 
service provider’s business model, which places such a high degree of 
reliance upon the judicial interpretation of a legislative provision, is 
fraught with legal danger. Other intermediaries have developed 
successful business models which minimise the risk of copyright 
infringement and fall safely within the safe harbors. There is no reason 
why YouTube should not do the same.  
                                                                                                                  
(ND Ill 2002); Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F 3d 643, 655 (7th Cir 2003); 
Hendrickson v eBay Inc, 165 F Supp 2d 1082, 1087 (CD Cal 2001). 
45 252 F Supp 2d 634, 658 (ND Ill 2002). 
   
 
 
